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FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN PERSONAL SERVICE
OCCUPATIONS: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
LIMITATIONS ON ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LEGISLATION
Alfred Avinst
Antidiscrimination Legislation in Personal Services
A majority of the states now has laws forbidding discrimination based
on race, creed, color, or national origin in "places of public accommoda-
tion."' While statutory definitions vary widely, most states include in
the definition of "places of public accommodation" one or more forms
of personal service occupations. Probably the personal service most often
singled out is barbering,2 although a number of statutes have been
broadened to include almost every service imaginable.'
Cases in the courts involving antidiscrimination legislation as applied
to personal service occupations have been few and far between. Several
cases have exempted such occupations from the scope of the statute by
strict construction,4 but others have included them within the ambit of
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1 Alaska Stat. § 11.60.230 (Supp. 1962); Cal. Civ. Code § 51; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 25-1-1 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-35 (1958); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7301 (Supp.
1963); fl1. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 125 (1961); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-901 (1956); Iowa Code
§ 735.1 (1962); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. 21-2424 (Supp. 1961); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 137, § 50
(1954); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 92A (1956); Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.343 (Supp.
1962); Minn. Stat. § 327.09 (1961); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 64-211 (1947); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 20-101 (1962); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354:1 (1961); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 10:1-5,
18:25-5 (Supp. 1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 49-8-1 (1962); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 40;
N.Y. Executive Law § 296; N.D. Cent. Code § 12-22-30 (Supp. 1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2901.35 (Page 1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.670 (1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4654
(1961); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 951 (Supp. 1963); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-24-1 (1956); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1451 (1959); Wash. Rev. Code § 9.91.010 (1961); Wisc. Stat. § 942.04
(1961); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-83.1 (1961). In addition, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 233.010 (1961) and
W. Va. Code Ann. § 265(156) (1961) have hortatory, but noncoercive, provisions.
2 Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin mention barbershops specifically.
3 California, Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and
Washington have very broad statutes which include almost every conceivable personal service
occupation. See, for example, Burks v. Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 320 P.2d 313,
20 Cal. Rpt. 609 (1962). In addition, a New York State Board of Regents rule now requires
the various medical and other professions licensed by it not to discriminate in serving
patients on pain of loss of license to practice. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1962, p. 29, col. 2;
id., Oct. 27, 1962, p. 27, col. 1.
4 Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (Super. Ct. 1957)
(dentist); Faulkner v. Solazzi, 79 Conn. 541, 65 At. 947 (1907) (barber); Burks v. Bosso,
180 N.Y. 341, 73 N.E. 58 (1905) (bootblack); Rice v. Rinaldo, 119 N.E.2d 657 (Ohio Ct
App. 1951).
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the law.5 However, as already noted, the lengthening statutory lists of
occupations or the sweeping statutory terminology no doubt includes
such occupations in an increasing number of states.
State Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Mustachio is a typical case
involving a barber shop. There, the Commission found that respondent
had attempted to discourage Negro patronage of his barber shop by
posting a sign saying: "Kinky Haircut-$5," and by attempting to
charge a Negro that price, which the Commission found was a "prohibi-
tive price far in excess of respondent's usual charge for cutting a white
person's hair." It ordered, inter alia, that the respondent barber write
to the complainant "offering to cut her son's hair at the regular rate
charged by respondent for cutting a white person's hair." It also ordered
him to "furnish to Negro customers services of the same quality as those
furnished to white customers and at the same rates."
The intent of this order is clear. It requires the respondent, a barber,
to work for a person and a group of persons whom he clearly does not
want to work for, upon pain of imprisonment if he refuses to do so.7 He
is thus required to serve, involuntarily, the complainant and other Negro
applicants.
A statute which requires one person to render involuntary service to
another immediately raises the question of its constitutionality under the
thirteenth amendment. Surprisingly, with the exception of one brief dis-
cussion in a dissenting opinion,8 no case has ever discussed this question.
Although there are a number of cases which have held antidiscrimination
legislation constitutional under the fourteenth amendment,9 no decision
has dealt with this matter under the far more specific provisions of the
thirteenth amendment.
Yet the thirteenth amendment would seem to apply far more directly
to antidiscrimination legislation in the rendition of personal services.
Whatever the vague contours of the phrase "nor shall any State deprive
any person of . . . liberty or property, without due process of law" as
found in the fourteenth amendment may mean, the thirteenth amendment
5 Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1919) (bootblack) ; Messenger v. State,
25 Neb. 674, 41 N.W. 638 (1889) (barber); Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash. 2d
440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959) (beauty salon); Washington State Bd. Against Discrimination v.
Interlake Realty, Inc., 7 Race Rel. L. Rep. 555 (Wash. Super Ct. 1962) (real estate brokier).
6 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 355 (1961), enforced, Index No. 4552-1961, Sup. Ct. Nassau County,
May 16, 1961.
7 Note, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526, 555 (1961); see People ex rel. N.Y. State Comm'n Against
Discrimination v. Ackley-Maynes Co., 4 Race Rel. L. Rep. 358 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1959) where refusal to obey a court order enforcing the Commission's order was
punished by fine and imprisonment.
8 Browning v. Slenderella Systems, supra note 5; see State v. Banwari, (1951] All India
Rep. All. 615 (Div. Ct.).
9 Annot., 49 A.L.R. 505 (1927).
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is quite specific: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall
exist within the United States ... ." (Emphasis added.) This article will
explore the meaning of the term "involuntary servitude," and its applica-
tion to personal service occupations.
Pre-Civil War Provisions in the Northwest
The words "involuntary servitude" first appear in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. The relevant provision is as follows:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Terri-
tory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted .... :o
As each of the areas of the territory emerged into a state, it copied
this provision into its state constitution in very similar language. Thus,
the provision is found in the pre-Civil War constitutions of Ohio,1
Indiana, 2 Illinois, 3 and Michigan. 4
The Ohio Constitution of 1802 contained an additional provision im-
mediately beneath the wording from the Northwest Ordinance. It stated:
Nor shall any person, arrived at the age of twenty-one years, or .female
person arrived at the age of eighteen years, be held to serve any person as
a servant, under the pretence of indenture or otherwise, unless such person
shall enter into such indenture while in a state of perfect freedom, and on
a condition of a bona fide consideration received or to be received for their
service, except as before excepted. Nor shall any indenture of any Negro
or Mulatto hereafter made and executed out of the state, or if made in
the state where the term of service exceeds one year, be of the least
validity, except those given in the case of apprenticeships.' 5
This provision, copied into the Illinois Constitution in almost identical
language, 16 is of considerable significance. Not only does this provision
contain the typical requirement that contracts of service be by indenture
to bind the servant,'7 but in addition it requires that contracts of service
10 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 6. It might be noted that the common-law roots
against involuntary servitude in England long antedated the Northwest Ordinance, and even
Sommersett's Case, 20 How. St. Tri. 1 (Eng. K.B. 1772) which held slavery to be illegal
in England. As early as Foster v. Jackson, I Hob. 52, 80 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1615) it
was said that a free person could not contract away his liberty. See Shanley v. Harvey, 2
Eden 126, 28 Eng. Rep. 844 (Ch. 1762); Smith v. Brown, 2 Salk. 666, 91 Eng. Rep. 566
(K.B. 1705); Chamberlain v. Harvey, 1 Ld. Raym. 146, 91 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B. 1694).
But see Pearne v. Lisle, 1 Arab. 75, 27 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1749). See also King v. Inhabi-
tants of Stow-market, 9 East 211, 103 Eng. Rep. 553 (K.B. 1808).
11 Ohio Const. art. VIII, § 2 (1802); Ohio Const. art. I, § 6 (1851).
12 Ind. Const. art. 11, § 7 (1816); Ind. Const. art. 1, § 37 (1857).
13 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1818); III. Const. art. XIII, § 16 (1848).
14 Mich. Const. art. XI, § 1 (1835); Mich. Const. art. XVIII, § 11 (1850); accord,
Iowa Const. art. I, § 23 (1846, 1857); Minn. Const. art. I, § 2 (1857) ; Wis. Const. art. I,
§ 2 (1848) contain similar provisions.
15 Ohio Const. art. VIII, § 2 (1802).
16 Ill. Const. art. VI, § 1 (1818).
17 Overseers of Poor of Hopewell Township v. Overseers of Poor of Amwell Township,
6 N.J.L. 169, 175 (Sup. Ct. 1822); Commonwealth ex rel. Ruggles v. Wilbank, 10 S. & R.
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be voluntarily entered into and for a valuable consideration. As further
protection for Negroes, except in the case of minors whose apprentice-
ship was automatically longer than one year, the maximum period per-
mitted for contracts of personal service was a year. Thus, the provision
sought to assure, by a variety of safeguards, that labor contracts were
made in a perfectly voluntary fashion and without coercion or imposition
of any kind.
Two decisions interpreting the foregoing provisions are of particular
note. In Phoebe v. Jay' the Illinois Supreme Court had before it a statute
which permitted the owner of a slave over fifteen years old to bring the
slave into Illinois, upon condition that he and the slave should come
before the court clerk and agree upon the term of years which the Negro
or mulatto would work for him. However, the statute also provided that if
the Negro or mulatto refused to agree to work for his owner, the latter
may take him back into slave territory. The court held that this statute
violated the Northwest Ordinance. It said:
Nothing can be conceived farther from the truth, than the idea that there
could be a voluntary contract between the negro and his master. The law
authorizes his master to bring his slave here, and take him before the clerk,
and if the negro will not agree to the terms proposed by the master, he is
authorized to remove him to his original place of servitude. I conceive that
it would be an insult to common sense to contend that the negro, under
the circumstances in which he was placed, had any free agency. The only
choice given him was a choice of evils. On either hand, servitude was to
be his lot. The terms proposed were, slavery for a period of years, gen-
erally extending beyond the probable duration of his life, or a return
to perpetual slavery in the place from whence he was brought. The inden-
turing was in effect an involuntary servitude for a period of years, and
was void, being in violation of the ordinance .... 19
Matter of Clark20 is even stronger. In that case, it was undisputed that
the petitioner had freely and voluntarily entered into a contract to serve
her master as a house maid. Later, she changed her mind, and brought
an action for habeas corpus to free herself from her master's service.
Notwithstanding the clear fact that she had initially entered into the con-
tract voluntarily, the Indiana Supreme Court held that "the appellant
is in a state of involuntary servitude; and we are bound by the constitu-
tion, the supreme law of the land, to discharge her therefrom. 21
First, it might be noted that the court disregarded the fact that the
petitioner was colored, and decided the case on general principles. It
416-17 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1823). This provision was designed to add solemnity to the obligation
of service and thereby to protect the servant against hasty agreements to serve.
18 1 Ill. 268 (1828).
19 Id. at 270.
20 1 Blackf. 134 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1821).
21 Id. at 126.
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went on to point out that compulsion by law for the performance of
personal service was degrading. It stated:
Many covenants, the breaches of which are only remunerated in damages,
might be specifically performed, either by a third person at a distance
from the adversary, or in a short space of time. But a covenant for service,
if performed at all, must be performed under the eye of the master; and
might, as in the case before us, require a number of years. Such a per-
formance, if enforced by law, would produce a state of servitude as de-
grading and demoralizing in its consequences, as a state of absolute slavery;
and if enforced under a government like ours, which acknowledges a per-
sonal equality, would be productive of a state of feeling more discordant
and irritating than slavery itself.22
Moreover, the court pointed out that whenever a court compelled a
person to perform service, "the losing party feels mortified and degraded
in being compelled to perform for the other what he had previously re-
fused, and the more especially if that performance will place him fre-
quently in the presence or under the direction of his adversary.12  Thus,
"if a man, contracting to labor for another a day, a month, a year, or
a series of years, were . . . compelled to perform the labor, it would...
produce in their performance a state of domination in the one party,
and abject humiliation in the other . . . A state of servitude thus pro-
duced, either by direct or permissive coercion, would not be considered
voluntary either in fact or in law."'24
From the above two cases, it can be seen that the words "involuntary
servitude," as found in the Northwest Ordinance, and incorporated into
the state constitutions of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio, have
their ordinary and natural meaning. They mean service or labor which
is not, at all times, performed voluntarily, and without any legal or other
compulsion. The agreement to serve must be entered into without coer-
cion, and must be completed without coercion. The provision, in short,
banned any sanctions which compelled one person to work for another,
for however short a period of time.
22 Id. at 124-25. In England also, specific performance cannot be obtained to compel
an employee to work, although the older cases do not rely on freedom of choice concepts.
See, e.g., Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, [18911 2 Ch. 416. However, Kahn-Freund,
Legal Framework 46-47 in "The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain" (Flanders
& Clegg ed. 1954) declares:
It goes without saying that this freedom of choice is often set at nought by economic
facts. Even so, it is one of the essential civil liberties of this country. One secondary
but important rule resulting from the principle against compulsory labour is that a
contract of employment cannot be enforced by what is known as a decree of specific
performance. If the employee absents himself or purports to terminate the employ-
ment without the requisite notice, the employer may from the court obtain a judgment
for damages, but he cannot, through an order of the court, compel the worker to work
for him. Nor can the employee compel the employer to employ him. No one has the
legal power to compel another man to work for him or to employ him.
23 Kahn-Freund, supra note 22, at 124.
24 Id. at 125.
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The Passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
The earliest bill to abolish "involuntary servitude," passed by Congress
during the Civil War period, was an act relating to the District of
Columbia,2 5 which abolished slavery in the District.2 This bill provided
that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except for crime, whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall hereafter exist in
said District.127 These words were substituted for "subjection to service
or labor proceeding from such cause [i.e., by reason of African descent]
shall not hereafter exist in said District." 28
Senator Ira Harris of New York offered the criticism that the bill
provided that" 'neither slavery nor involuntary servitude' shall exist here,
as though they were two distinct things. I suppose, but I am not sure
about it, that up to this time the term 'slavery' has not been introduced
into the legislation of the country." Senator Lot M. Morrill, the Maine
Republican who drafted the substitution for the Committee on the District
of Columbia, replied that "this is the exact language of the ordinance of
1787." Senator Harris renewed his objection. He argued: "I have a
further suggestion to make, and that is that the term 'involuntary servi-
tude' will embrace the condition of apprentices, unless the phrase 'by
reason of African descent' in the beginning of the section shall control,
as perhaps it will." 29
Senator Jacob Collomer of Vermont replied to this: "the phrase
'slavery or involuntary servitude' has received a construction under the
ordinance of 1787.2''s Aside from another comment that this bill enacted
the Northwest Ordinance"' in the Senate, and a futile plea to extend the
bill to cover "white persons who are enslaved" in the territories,32 nothing
more was said which was relevant.
Section 9 of the "Confiscation Bill,"131 as enacted into law, declared
that slaves of rebels "shall be forever free of their servitude and not
again held as slaves.134 Here again, the Northwest Ordinance was con-
sidered a model. Congressman Samuel S. Blair of Pennsylvania stated:
"the ordinance of 1787 was, indeed, great, for it preserved freedom;
25 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1862).
26 Act of April 16, 1862, ch. 54, § 1, 12 Stat. 376.
27 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1191 (1862).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas said: "the first section of the bill extends over
this District the ordinance of 1787; and I think there is no doubt as to the effect of that."
He further noted: "I think passing the ordinance of 1787 as provided in the first section of
this bill will set the matter at rest . . . ." Id. at 1285.
32 Id. at 1643.
33 Id. at 3275.
34 Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 195, § 9, 12 Stat. 589.
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this is greater, for it restores freedom. That kept slavery out; this put
it out."'35
The thirteenth amendment was introduced as a joint resolution (S.
J. Res. 16, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864)) in the Senate on January
13, 1864, by Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri,36 and was reported
back from the Committee on the Judiciary, changed in wording to its
present form, by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois. The amendment
of the Judiciary Committee was agreed to by the Senate.38
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the equalitarian Radical,
criticized the committee for adhering to "the Jeffersonian ordinance."
He proposed to amend their draft by striking out the words of the
ordinance and substituting: "All persons are equal before the law, so
that no person can hold another as a slave." 39 He declared:
I do not know that I shall have the concurrence of other Senators in the
criticism which I make upon it; but I understand that it starts with the
idea of reproducing the Jeffersonian ordinance. I doubt the expediency
of reproducing that ordinance. It performed an excellent work in its day;
but there are words in it which are entirely inapplicable to our time.40
Sumner's main objection was to the words "nor involuntary servitude
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted." He commented that at one time it was the custom
to doom criminals as slaves for life as a punishment, but that "slavery
in our day is something distinct, perfectly well known, requiring no
words of distinction outside of itself." He contended that the discussion
of involuntary servitude was surplusage and would "introduce a doubt."
Sumner also had some grammatical quibbles which he argued were
not to be found in the Northwest Ordinance. These did not appeal to
the other members.41 Trumbull showed his irritation at Sumner's re-
jection of the committee language, saying:
I do not know that I should have adopted these precise words, but a major-
ity of the committee thought they were the best words; they accomplish
the object; and I cannot see why the Senator from Massachusetts should
be so pertinacious about particular words. The words that we have adopted
will accomplish the object. If every member of the Senate is to select the
precise words in which a law shall be clothed, and will be satisfied with
none other, we shall have very little legislation.
35 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2298 (1862).
36 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1864).
37 Id. at 553.
38 Id. at 1447.
39 Id. at 1483, 1487.
40 Id. at 1488.
41 At one point Senator James R. Doolittle of Wisconsin contradicted him and declared:
"they are both in the Jeffersonian ordinance." Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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Trumbull sneered at Sumner's attempt to copy language from the
French Revolution, and declined to alter the committee's version which
it had agreed on. Senator Jacob M. Howard of Michigan joined the
barrage against Sumner by declaring that the language was legally mean-
ingless, and inapplicable as well. After noting that the French Constitution
was meant only to equalize political rights, he declared:
Now, sir, I wish as much as the Senator from Massachusetts in making
this amendment to use significant language, language that cannot be mistaken
or misunderstood; but I prefer to dismiss all reference to French constitutions
or French codes, and go back to the good old Anglo-Saxon language em-
ployed by our fathers in the ordinance of 1787, an expression which has
been adjudicated upon repeatedly, which is perfectly well understood both
by the public and by judicial tribunals, a phrase, I may say further, which
is peculiarly near and dear to the people of the Northwestern Territory,
from whose soil slavery was excluded by it. I think it is well understood,
well comprehended by the people of the United States, and that no court
of justice, no magistrate, no person, old or young, can misapprehend the
meaning and effect of that clear, brief, and comprehensive clause. I hope
we shall stand by the report of the committee. 43
Upon this, Sumner withdrew his amendment, and the joint resolution
passed the Senate on April 8, 1864.11
The joint resolution had a more difficult time in the House. There it
was introduced by Congressman James F. Wilson of Iowa, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, on December 14, 1863.41 When it
came to a final vote on June 15, 1864, it received only ninety-three yeas
to sixty-five nays, and failed for want of a two-thirds majority.46 How-
ever, after the November elections in which Lincoln was reelected and the
Republicans were victorious, the second session of the Thirty-Eighth
Congress met in the winter of that year. At that time, Congressman
James M. Ashley of Ohio, who had originally voted in the negative,
moved to reconsider the vote.47 On January 31, 1865, almost at the close
of the war, the measure passed the House by 119 yea to fifty-six nay.48
Debates in the House were largely confined to generalities on the evils
of slavery by those who proposed to abolish it, and states' rights by those
who opposed the amendment. There were only passing references to the
word "servitude."49 One opponent of the amendment declared that there
43 Id. at 1489.
44 Id. at 1490.
45 Id.at 21.
46 Id. at 2995.
47 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1864).
48 Id. at 531.
49 For example, Congressman Thomas T. Davis of New York declared that "this war
sprang from the aristocracy of the South in an effort to maintain a system of servitude on
which alone that aristocracy could be perpetuated." Id. at 154. Congressman George H.
Yeaman of Kentucky stated that "slavery is the idea of the right of one to claim, and the
duty of another to render, involuntary service." Id. at 171; see id. at 190, 200.
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could be property in the service of others, if state law so provided, a
position rejected by a proponent. 50 Another declared that "in any form
of civilization resembling our own, servitude will always exist." He
stated that servitudes merely differed in degree, and that the poor English
factory workers were in "bondage" and had "little to boast of [their]
freedom." Stating that the "freedom of a British working man consists
in a limited liberty to change his employer," he went on to proclaim that
such a condition was little better than slavery.5 However, no one seems
to have paid much attention to this line of argument on the other side.
It is clear from the foregoing materials that Congress intended to enact
the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance, familiar to so many Senators
as part of the constitutions of their own states, into the thirteenth amend-
ment. It is equally clear that the judicial interpretations of that ordi-
nance, discussed above, were intended to be carried along with the
language of the ordinance itself into the United States Constitution.
Senator Sumner proposed to declare all men equal, but Congress rejected
this. Instead of enacting equality, it enacted liberty.
The Right To Refrain From Work
The "involuntary servitude" forbidden by the thirteenth amendment
applies only to the rendition of personal labor.52 The performance of im-
personal acts, such as giving instructions to a subordinate agent to take
certain action, does not fall within the ambit of the amendment.53 While
labor enforced as a punishment "is in the strongest sense of the words,
'involuntary servitude,' "I' the term includes enforced labor which is
not intended for punitive purposes,55 and which may even be intended
as a benefit.56
50 Id. at 214-15 (exchange between Congressman Chilton A. White of Ohio and Con-
gressman John F. Farnsworth of Illinois).
5' Id. at 177-78 (Congressman Elijah Ward of New York).
52 Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873).
53 In Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 199 (1921) Mr. Justice
Holmes said:
It is objected finally that c. 951, above stated, in so far as it required active services
to be rendered to the tenants, is void on the rather singular ground that it infringes the
Thirteenth Amendment. It is true that the traditions of our law are opposed to com-
pelling a man to perform strictly personal services against his will even when he has
contracted to render them. But the services in question although involving some
activities are so far from personal that they constitute the universal and necessary
incidents of modern apartment houses. They are analogous to the services that in the
old law might issue out of or be attached to land. We perceive no additional difficulties
in this statute, if applicable as assumed.
5 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885); accord, Flannagan v. Jopson, 177 Iowa 393,
158 N.W. 641 (1916); Smolcyzk v. Gaston, 147 Neb. 681, 24 N.W.2d 862 (1946); see
Thompson v. Bunton, 117 Mo. 83, 22 S.W. 863 (1893) where a person's services were sold
to the highest bidder.
55 United States v. McClellan, 127 Fed. 971 (S.D. Ga. 1904); Matter of Chung Fat, 96
Fed. 202 (D. Wash. 1899).
56 Matter of Turner, 24 Fed. Cas. 337 (No. 14247) (C.C. Md. 1867).
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Nor does it matter whether a person is compensated for his labor. One
case held:
Whether appellant was to be paid much, or little or nothing, is not the
question. It is not uncompensated service, but involuntary servitude which
is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Compensation for service
may cause consent, but unless it does it is no justification for forced
labor.57
Thus, the term "involuntary servitude" has been defined as "the condi-
tion of one who is compelled by force, coercion or imprisonment and
against his will to labor for another whether he is paid or not."' ,, The
constitutional provision accordingly gives every person the right to re-
frain from performing services for every other person.
To the right to refrain from work there is one well-recognized excep-
tion. Government may command the services of everyone in the perform-
ance of its essential tasks. In Butler v. Perry59 the United States Supreme
Court said the following about the thirteenth amendment:
It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as
exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of
those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as service in the
army, militia, on the jury, etc. The great purpose in view was liberty
under the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the
latter by depriving it of essential services.60
The most common example of involuntary service for the Government
is military service0' in all of its aspects. 2 In lieu of actual military service,
Congress has required that conscientious objectors do work of national
importance, and the courts have found this to be constitutionally un-
objectionable. 3 Often, such work of national importance includes activi-
ties not directly beneficial to any particular individual, and under the
direct jurisdiction of the federal government, such as soil conservation,
forestry, tree planting, construction of fire towers and roads, and similar
public activities. 4 Such work, however, may fall under the jurisdiction
5"1 Hefin v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1944); accord, [1953] All India Rep.
H.P. 18.
58 Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ili. 193, 200, 197 N.E. 768, 772 (1935).
59 240 U.S. 328 (1916).
0 Id. at 333. India followed this view in drafting Article 23(2) of the 1949 constitution.
See Budhia v. State of Bihar, [1952) All Indian Rep. Pat. 359, 31 Indian L.R. Pat. Ser. 493.
61 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); United States v. Sugar, 243 Fed.
423 (E.D. Mich. 1917).
02 Bertelsen v. Cooney, 213 F.2d 275 (5th Cir. 1954).
03 Reese v. United States, 225 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1955); Atherton v. United States, 176
F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1949); Hopper v. United States, 142 F.2d 181 (9th Cir. 1943) ; United
States v. Brooks, 54 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 147 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945); United States ex rel. Zucker v. Osborne, 54 F. Supp. 984
(W.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd, 147 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 881 (1945).
04 Wolfe v. United States, 149 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1945); United States v. Smith, 124
F. Supp. 406 (E.D. nl. 1954).
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of a state or local government agency, on the theory that they also
perform activities of national concern. 5
One activity, which may be questioned, is work in hospitals, which the
courts have upheld for conscientious objectors in lieu of military
service.66 This has even been extended as far as work in private, non-
sectarian university hospitals ministering to the public." Here, some
of the work might be said to confer some direct benefits on individuals,
as distinguished from the community as a whole. If a person were re-
quired to work for the benefit of particular individuals, as distinguished
from the community, then such work would constitute involuntary
servitude.
The cases, however, carefully limit such work to service for community
benefit only. As one case held:
It is of no moment under whose direction the work is done. If it aids in
our preparedness, civilian service is not open to challenge as involuntary
servitude. We need only state the analogy sought to be drawn between the
work to which these defendants were assigned and assignment to Macy's
basement to demonstrate that the analogy in fact does not exist. 68
Moreover, civilian service by conscientious objectors is designed to
free others for military service, and to protect morale and preserve
discipline in the armed forces. 9 If persons could escape any form of
service by claiming conscientious objection, many would be found to do
65 Klubnikin v. United States, 227 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1955); see United State v. Niles,
122 F. Supp. 382, 384 (N.D. Calif. 1954), aff'd, 220 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 349
U.S. 939 (1955) where the lower court said:
A health program conducted by any political subdivision of this nation contributes
to the general welfare of the nation as a whole. The mere fact that such activities are
carried out in the name of a political subdivision of the state or county rather than in
the name of the United States itself, does not diminish the importance of the work,
or cause it to lose its contributory relationship to the national health.
Certainly national defense and preparedness is accomplished by more than the
strength of arms alone.
66 Klubnikin v. United States, supra note 65; see United States v. Lebherz, 129 F. Supp.
444 (D.N.J. 1955); United States v. Sutter, 127 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Calif. 1954).
67 United States v. Hoepker, 223 F.2d 921, 922-23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
841 (1955) where the court said:
Congress has declared that maintenance of the mental and physical health of our
population is a subject of vital federal concern in times of emergency .... The protec-
tion of the public health is no less work of national importance whether it is done
in an institution controlled by federal or by state authorities or by a private charitable
corporation.
The evidence is conclusive that the University of Chicago is a nonsectarian, non-
profit corporation, and that its clinics, to which Thomas was ordered to report for
work, minister, on a charitable basis, indiscriminately, to alleviate the physical ills of the
general public. In addition to that activity, these clinics, aided by grants of federal
funds, carry on extensive research in cancer and other diseases. We hold that this
is work of "national" importance which the Act authorized.
68 United States v. Hoepker, supra note 67, at 923.
69 Howze v. United States, 272 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1959); United States v. Smith, supra
note 64.
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so who in fact had no such scruples. As a result, dissatisfaction among
military personnel would become rife. However, even such service must
be designed to benefit the community as a whole or it will constitute
involuntary servitude.
Certain other civilian work for the Government has been upheld, even
in time of peace. Labor on the public highways is not "involuntary
servitude,"7 nor is jury duty, nor the requirement that abutting owners
remove snow and ice from sidewalks and gutters.7 Government may
impose the duty of making reports to public authorities,72 including tax
reporting7 3 It may require individuals to collect taxes for it,74 and to
perform other occasional duties. 5
Nongovernmental duties may be imposed only in the most exceptional
circumstances. One case held that involuntary servitude was not imposed
by the requirement that a man work to support his family.76 Noting that
these were "services always treated as exceptional," the court held that
"the obligation of a husband and father to maintain his family, if in any
way able to do so, is one of the primary responsibilities established by
human nature and by civilized society."77
Of course, this case does not hold that the husband is required to
perform any particular kind of work to support his family. He may
choose any work and any employer, if able. But if nothing else presents
itself, he must work at what he can get. This requirement is based on two
special circumstances. Firstly, he has voluntarily undertaken the obliga-
tion of raising a family. Secondly, no one else exists who can support his
family. Thus, there is a special condition and obligation which imposes on
him the duty of working.
In Ule v. State78 the Indiana Supreme Court held that a state may
require a motorist who has struck and injured another person on the
highway with his automobile to stop and render assistance to the in-
jured party. The court declared that this was not involuntary servitude
because it is a duty owed to the state and because an automobile is a
70 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916); Matter of Dassler, 35 Kan. 684, 12 Pac. 130
(1886).
71 State ex rel. Curtis v. City of Topeka, 36 Kan. 76, 12 Pac. 310 (1886).
72 Schick v. City of New Orleans, 49 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 656
(1931).
73 Porth v. Broderick, 214 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1954).
74 State ex rel. Am v. State Comm'n of Revenue & Taxation, 163 Kan. 240, 181 P.2d
532 (1947); see Budhia v. State of Bihar, [1952] All India Rep. Pat. 359, 31 Indian L.R.
Pat. Ser. 493.
75 Crews v. Lundquist, 361 Ill. 193, 197 N.E. 768 (1935).
78 Commonwealth v. Pouliot, 292 Mass. 229, 198 N.E. 256 (1935).
77 Id. at 231-32, 198 N.E. at 257.
78 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140 (1935).
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dangerous instrumentality, and since a state may prohibit it, it may annex
reasonable conditions to its use.
The first reason is unsatisfactory, since every duty imposed by a state
does not become a duty owed to the state. The duty is clearly owed
to the injured motorist or pedestrian. The second reason is more persua-
sive since a state may undertake to lessen the hazards of driving by
imposing upon the driver the duty to assist one injured by his actions.
In terms of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude,
the most persuasive rationale for this exception is the special connection
between the injured party and the one who has injured him. In an isolated
area, no other assistance may be available. The state may reasonably act
to save the lives and protect the health of its citizens, and where it cannot
otherwise do so, it may impose this duty on one who, by his voluntary
act in driving, has been the cause of the injury. Involuntary servitude is
not imposed by requiring one to repair a wrong he has inflicted. He is
the most appropriate person for the duty, performance of which is vital
to life or health. While his service may not be willing, he is simply required
to preserve that which he has jeopardized.
Two other cases are worthy of note. A lower Delaware court has held
that a state may, as a war measure, mobilize its entire population to raise
food and produce supplies. 9 However, the authority of this case is
somewhat doubtful in the light of a decision of the Supreme Court of West
Virginia holding that a statute which provided that anyone who did not
work for thirty-six hours a week at a recognized occupation during
World War I and for six months thereafter was guilty of a misdemeanor,
was violative of the thirteenth amendment and hence unconstitutional."
Making and serving someone else a hamburger is not work for the
government, for one's family, or for a party one has injured. Nor is
cutting another's hair, carrying his luggage, shining his shoes, or per-
forming other personal services for him. The thirteenth amendment gives
every person the right to refrain from working for any other person.
It protects barbers, hotel clerks, shoe-shine men, sales clerks, waiters,
and waitresses, just as much as it protects cotton-pickers, field hands, or
farm laborers. A waitress can no more be required to wait on all persons
who come into her shop without discrimination than can a cotton-picker
be required to pick cotton for all who want to hire him, without dis-
crimination. The thirteenth amendment guarantees the right to refrain
from work, from all work, from some work, or from work for some
people. To coerce personal service is to impose involuntary servitude.
79 State v. McClure, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 265, 105 At. 712 (Gen. Sess. 1919).
80 Ex parte Hudgins, 86 W. Va. 526, 103 S.E. 327 (1920).
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The Right To Discontinue Work
The compulsory fulfillment of a contract for personal service, once
voluntarily made, would not necessarily seem, on principle, to consti-
tute involuntary servitude. This was, in fact, the rule in the Kingdom of
Hawaii, and later the Republic of Hawaii, before joining the Union."1
The performance of labor contracts, especially on agricultural plantations,
was enforced by fine and imprisonment, notwithstanding the prohibition
in the Hawaiian Constitution against "involuntary servitude." The ration-
ale of this position was stated as follows:
A fair and honest contract to work for another, willingly and freely
made with a knowledge of the circumstances, cannot be said to have
created a condition of involuntary servitude. The contract which creates
the state or condition of service, if it is voluntary when made and the con-
ditions and circumstances remain unchanged, except that the mind of the
one who serves is now unwilling to fulfill it, is not by that fact changed
into a contract of involuntary servitude forbidden by law. If the contract
is lawful and constitutional in its inception, it does not become illegal
or unconstitutional at the option of one of the parties to it.82
81 J. Nott & Co. v. Kanahele, 4 Hawaii 14 (1877). This was also the rule in Scotland,
a civil law country. The view there was that "the contract [to serve] must be willingly
entered into; otherwise it is slavery." Fraser, Master and Servant 3 (3d ed. 1882). Under
Roman civil law, which prevails in Scotland, it was generally considered "inconsistent with
civil liberty that they [personal service contracts] should be specifically enforced" when
not actually begun. Id. at 102. An exception was made, however, in the case of certain
workers. In Clerk v. Murchison, Sess. Cas. 9186 (Scot. Seas. Ct. 3d Ser. 1799) it was
held that "if a servant enlist after being hired, but before entering to his service, the
contract remain in nudis finibus; and being a personal one, the rule prior tempore potior
jure will not apply. The master's only remedy is an action of damages against the servant.
But after the servant has entered into his employment, the master can enforce the comple-
tion of his engagement, remediis pretoriis." In the leading case of Raeburn v. Reid,
3 Sess. Cas. 69 (Scot. Sess. Ct. 1st Ser. 1824) a coal miner deserted, and his employer had
him imprisoned. A divided Court of Session held this legal. Lord Gillies, however, dissented,
saying that a contract to serve was like any other civil contract, which would only be
enforced by damages, and that if a defaulting servant could be imprisoned; so could a
defaulting tenant, landlord, or other party to a contract.
The authority of Raeburn v. Reid was reinforced by statute, 4 Geo. 4, c. 34 (1823)
(repealed), which was passed while this case was pending and which was enacted as a conse-
quence of discussions arising out of the case. Fraser, supra at 382. The rationale of this
rule was that "this, though sometimes a harsh proceeding, is sanctioned [because] . . . a
workman, by deserting, may do great injury to his master, and such as he has not the
means of repairing." Anderson v. Moon, 15 Sess. Cas. 412, 414 (Scot. Sess. Ct., 1st Ser. 1837) ;
see Paterson v. Edington, Fac. Coll. 757, 761 (Scot. Sess. Ct. 1830). This rule was followed
for a number of years. See Cameron v. Murray, 4 Sess. Cas. 547. (Scot. Sess. Ct., 3d Ser.
1866); Hamilton v. Outram, 17 Sess. Cas. 798 (Scot. Sess. Ct., 2d Ser. 1855); Lees v.
Grangemouth Coal Co., 18 Jur. 273 (Scot. Sess. Ct. 1846); Anderson v. Moon, supra; Book-
less v. Normand, 11 Sess. Cas. 50 (Scot. Sess. Ct., 1st Ser. 1832) ; Stewart v. Stewart, 10 Sess.
Cas. 674 (Scot. Sess. Ct., 1st Ser. 1832) ; Paterson v. Edington, supra; Campbell v. Ander-
son, 4 Sess. Cas. 476 (Scot. Sess. Ct., 1st Ser. 1826) ; Gentle v. M'Lellan, 4 Sess. Cas. 165
(Scot. Sess. Ct., 1st Ser. 1825). Even so, the rule was questioned by Lord Fullerton in Tulkley
& Co. v. Anderson, 5 Sess. Cas. 1096 (Scot. Sess. Ct., 2d Ser. 1843) and by Lord Jeffrey
in Lees v. Grangemouth Coal Co., supra. Moreover, it was never applied by the Sheriff
Courts to professional men or domestic servants. Fraser, supra at 107. The remedy of
imprisonment was greatly modified by the Master & Servant Act of 1867, 30 & 31 Vict.,
c. 141, § 9 (repealed) and abolished by the Employers & Workmen Act of 1875, 38 & 39
Vict., c. 90, § 9.
82 Hilo Sugar Co. v. Mioshi, 8 Hawaii 201, 205 (1891); see Madan Mohan Biswas v.
Queen-Empress, 19 Indian L.R. Cal. Ser. 572 (1892).
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Even in Hawaii, however, it was held than an employer could not
assign a labor contract without the consent of the worker, 8 on the theory
that the new employer might have a less agreeable personality. 4 Consider-
ing the fact that the employer might change his ways during the term of
the contract, this reasoning would also support the right of the employee
to quit at any time.
This is, in fact, the rule in the United States. Federal statutes have
abolished involuntary servitude in liquidation of any debt or obligation,
or for any other reason, 5 and have made keeping a person in peonage a
crime.88
The hallmark of peonage was compulsory service in the payment of a
debt.87 Under this system, "the citizen could sell his own services, and
could contract with another for the exercise of dominion thereafter over
his person and liberty, so that he could be held or subjected, against his
will, to the performance of his 'obligation.' ,,s8 This practice was most
prevalent in the South during the turn of the 20th century, where
several state cases held that farm laborers could not be forced to work
out advances.8 9
Since the thirteenth amendment, unlike the fourteenth amendment, is
not directed exclusively at state action, but applies as well to private
action, compulsory labor is unconstitutional even when exacted without
benefit of state law. In Clyatt v. United States"' the Supreme Court
pointed out why compulsory service was unconstitutional. It stated:
83 Dreier v. Kuaa, 4 Hawaii 534 (1882); Owners of the Waihee Plantation v. Kalapu,
3 Hawaii 760 (1877). See King v. Inhabitants of Stowmarket, 9 East 211, 103 Eng.
Rep. 553 (Eng. K.B. 1808). And in Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd.,
[1940] A.C. 1014, 1020 (Eng.) Viscount Simon, Lord High Chancellor, said: "It will
be readily conceded that the result contended for by the respondents in this case would
be at complete variance with a fundamental principle of our common law - the principle,
namely, that a free citizen, in the exercise of his freedom, is entitled to choose the employer
whom he promises to serve . .. 2
84 See Judd, J., dissenting in 3. Nott & Co. v. Kanahele, supra note 81, at 21-22:
It is no answer to say that one master is as good as another for the laborer, providing
he fulfill all the written conditions of his contract, and observe whatever the law
commands, doing nothing that is forbidden by it. Men are not cast in the same mold,
and so long as differences of disposition and character exist, just so long some masters
will be preferred to others, and the laborer, if he is a free man, ought to be allowed
to exercise his right of choice.
85 14 Stat. 546 (1867), 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1958).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1958).
87 Jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 190, 194 (1857) stated as follows: "One fact existed
universally: all were indebted to their masters. This was the cord by which they seemed
bound to their masters' service . . . . He could not abandon the service; and if he did,
his master pursued, reclaimed, and reduced him to obedience and labor again .
88 Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 679 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
89 Holland v. State, 29 Ala. App. 181, 194 So. 412 (1940); Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla. 29,
74 So. 17 (1917) (statute making refusal to perform a labor contract a crime held to impose
involuntary servitude); Ex parte Hollman, 79 S.C. 9, 60 S.E. 19 (1908) (same). See State
ex rel. Hobbs v. Murrell, 170 Tenn. 152, 93 S.W.2d 628 (1936) holding that a person cannot
be confined to work out costs even if he had agreed to do so.
90 United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527 (1944). See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25
(1942).
91 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
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But peonage, however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude.
The peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by the payment of the
debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A clear distinction exists
between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of
services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though con-
tracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like any
other contractor to an action for damages for breach of that contract, can
elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or
a continuance of the service.9 2
The sweeping scope of the right to cease work is apparent even in
labor dispute cases, where the courts frequently enjoin strikes when they
are illegal. The theory herp is that the cessation of work itself is not
being enjoined, but that the illegal combination or conspiracy is the
object of the injunction." Thus, the courts enjoin the strike as the means
by which the unlawful plan is carried into execution.94
Even in labor dispute cases, however, the courts have been careful to
refrain from preventing any employee from quitting work of his own
volition for any reason. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court ap-
pears to have sanctioned the constitutional right of employees to leave
work in' concert. Thus, in one case in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
proceeded on the "conspiracy theory,"9 5 the United States Supreme
92 Id. at 215-16. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911) where the court added:
The fact that the debtor contracted to perform the labor which is sought to be com-
pelled does not withdraw the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the sta-
tute .... It is the compulsion of the service that the statute inhibits, for when that
occurs the condition of servitude is created, which would not be less involuntary be-
cause of the original agreement to work out the indebtedness. The contract exposes
the debtor to liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforced labor.
93 In State v. Local 8-6, Oil Workers Union, 317 S.W.2d 309, 325 (Mo. 1958) the court
said: "the section under attack is directed against a strike or concerted refusal to work and
has nothing to do with one or more quitting work of their own volition. The section does
not have the purpose or effect of imposing involuntary servitude in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment." See Local 134, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 46 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1931).
94 This was clearly pointed out in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Local 134, International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 2 F.2d 993, 994-95 (N.D. III. 1924) where the court said:
As to clause 1 of the prayer for a temporary injunction it is said that it prevents
employees from ceasing to work, and therefore imposes involuntary servitude upon
them. The right to cease work is no more an absolute right than is any other right
protected by the Constitution. Broadly speaking, of course, one has the right to work
for whom he will, to cease work when he wishes, and to be answerable to no one unless
he has been guilty of a breach of contract. But the cessation of work may be an
affirmative step in an unlawful plan. One may not accept employment intending thereby
to quit work when that act will enable him to perform one step in a criminal conspiracy.
The real wrong is the acceptance of the employment, with intent to make use of it
for a criminal purpose.
.... That no excuse for misrepresenting the true scope of this injunction may remain,
the following should be added: "Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit any
employee from voluntarily ceasing work unless said act is in furtherance of the con-
spiracy charged in the bill herein to prevent plaintiff from performing its contracts
with its customers and to compel plaintiff to discharge employees who are not members
of labor unions which are affiliated with said defendants."
95 Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 250 Wis. 550, 562-63, 27
N.W.2d 875, 881 (1947), aff'd, 336 U.S. 245 (1949) said:
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Court, in affirming its decree, narrowed the basis for the injunction still
further. It said:
The Union contends that the statute as thus applied violates the Thirteenth
Amendment in that it imposes a form of compulsory service or involuntary
servitude. However, nothing in the statute or the order makes it a crime
to abandon work individually . . .or collectively. Nor does either under-
take to prohibit or restrict any employee from leaving the service of the
employer, either for reason or without reason, either with or without
notice. The facts afford no foundation for the contention that any action
of the State has the purpose or effect of imposing any form of involuntary
servitude.96
From this case, it can be seen that employees have a constitutional
right to leave work in concert, as long as such concerted action is not in
furtherance of an illegal plan, and in any case, a right to leave work
singly. As one court put it: "It would be an invasion of one's natural
liberty to compel him to work for or to remain in the personal service of
another. One who is placed under such constraint is in a condition of in-
voluntary servitude . . .97
The right to leave the employ of another does not include the right
to engage in action which is likely to result in injury to persons or
property damage. When once an employee undertakes a job, he cannot
leave at such a point that injury or damage is a natural consequence of
his cessation of work. Where there is no such threat, he may leave at any
time, but where such a possibility exists, he must either give such notice
as will enable the employer to avert the danger, or delay his departure
until the danger has passed. One case illustrated this point quite well, as
follows:
It is not contended that leaving the service cannot under any circum-
stances be made a criminal offense. Doubtless it is competent for legis-
lation to make it a criminal offense for an employ6, without giving reason-
able notice, to suddenly quit duties the continued performance of which, for
the time being, under the conditions of the particular calling, is necessary
to prevent the endangering of life, health, or limb, or inflicting other
grievous inconvenience and sacrifice upon the public. Surely a train dis-
patcher, indicted for suddenly leaving the service without giving orders
necessary to prevent the clash of opposing trains upon a railroad, could
not successfully plead, when destruction of life and property were brought
about by his sudden leaving, that he could not be punished, because he
The quitting and remaining from work ia the instant cases was done pursuant to a
conspiracy to carry out an unlawful plan. There are many cases to the point that a
conspiracy to commit a criminal act may be enjoined ....
.... For two or more persons to conspire to do an act to the injury of another
which one person acting alone might lawfully do constitutes in this state a legal
wrong.... If a conspiracy to do a criminal act may be enjoined so may conspiracy to
do an illegal act not criminal.
96 Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 251 (1949).
97 Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1894).
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did no more than breach a contract of service. In these and like cases, the
criminal law would be exerted not to compel performance, or to prevent
quitting the service in a reasonable way, but because, by abandoning it in
an unreasonable way, the employ6 has created a condition of affairs, the
natural, direct, and known result of which is to endanger life, health, or
limb, or to inflict grievous public injury.98
Robertson v. Baldwin9 9 can best be explained on this rationale. In
that case, a majority of the United States Supreme Court held that a
sailor was bound to fulfill his contract of service even though, during
his term, he desired to quit. After pointing out the danger to be antici-
pated to the ship, its passengers, crew, and cargo, from indiscriminate
quitting by seamen, the Court held that the service was exceptional,
and hence that restrictions on cessation of work did not constitute
"involuntary servitude."'10 0
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented. He took an absolutist position on the
other side. He said that "the condition of one who contracts to render
personal services in connection with the private business of another
becomes a condition of involuntary servitude from the moment he is
compelled against his will to continue in such service."'n 0  Thus, the
majority of the court declared that a seaman could be forced to serve his
full term; the dissent declared that he could not be required to serve any
of it. 0 2
Between these two extremes there is a middle ground. A sailor might
be required to serve until he could be conveniently replaced. To compel
him not to abandon ship in the middle of the ocean or even in a strange
port seems like a logical method of assuring the safe return of the vessel.
98 Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 685-86 (M.D. Ala. 1903). The rule is the same in England.
See Electricity (Supply) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 100, § 31; Conspiracy and Protection
of Property Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 86, § 4. Section 5 of the latter statute makes it a
criminal offense wilfully and maliciously to break a contract of service or of hiring, knowing
or having reasonable cause to believe that the probable consequence will be "to endanger
human life, or cause serious bodily injury, or to expose valuable property . . . to destruc-
tion or serious injury."99 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
100 Id. at 282 where the Court said:
It is clear, however, that the amendment was not intended to introduce any novel
doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of service which have always been treated
as exceptional; such as military and naval enlistments, or to disturb the right of
parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards. The amend-
ment, however, makes no distinction between a public and a private service. To say that
persons engaged in a public service are not within the amendment is to admit that
there are exceptions to its general language, and the further question is at once presented,
where shall the line be drawn? We know of no better answer to make than to say
that services which have from time immemorial been treated as exceptional shall not
be regarded as within its purview.
The rule is the same in England. See Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60,§§ 221-24.
101 Robertson v. Baldwin, supra note 99, at 301. [Emphasis by the court.]
102 See Elman v. Moiler, 11 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1926) holding that it would be involuntary
servitude to require a sailor to fulfill his contract to serve on board ship but, curiously
enough, not citing or discussing Robertson v. Baldwin, supra note 99.
1964]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
To require him to continue serving after the vessel has reached an
American port and a replacement can be secured is to nullify the free-
dom of a sailor to change jobs by an exception to the general rule not
warranted by the actual facts of the case. Insofar as Robertson v. Baldwin
extends to such service, it stands on a very shaky foundation.
The implications of the right to cease work for antidiscrimination
legislation are clear. Since personal service is compelled in the first
place, it is obvious that to permit the cessation of work before completion
would frustrate the purposes of the law. It would hardly do to permit the
unwilling barber to cut one side of his customer's head of hair or shave
one side of his face, and then announce that he was unwilling to go any
further. Obviously, antidiscrimination legislation in personal services
infringes on the right to cease work as well as the right not to start it.
Voluntariness of Service
That antidiscrimination legislation in personal services requires "servi-
tude" has already been demonstrated beyond doubt. A question may be
raised, however, as to whether such service to a Negro would be "in-
voluntary." An argument may be made that the barber, for example, is
free to cease barbering at any time. Hence, it may be contended, that
as long as he voluntarily continues to be a barber, he is not subjected to
involuntary servitude if he is forced to serve all who apply.
Preliminarily, such an argument overlooks the right to work. The
"liberty" mentioned in the fourteenth amendment includes the right to
"work .. . to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
livelihood or avocation . . . . [And] the right to follow any of the
common occupations of life is an inalienable right."' °3 The Supreme
Court has held that "the right to work for a living in the common occupa-
tions of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and
opportunity that it was the purpose of the [fourteenth amendment] ...
to secure."'0 4 Indeed, the Court pointed out that to deny persons the right
to work to earn a living is tantamount to excluding them from the state,
since "in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work."'0 5
To say that a person must either work for everyone involuntarily or
not work at all is to require him to choose between his thirteenth amend-
ment rights and his fourteenth amendment rights. Such a rule conditions
103 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). See the statement of Representative
John A. Bingham of Ohio, who drafted the first section of the fourteenth amendment, that
liberty "is the liberty ... to work in an honest calling and contribute by your toil in
some sort to the support of yourself . . . ." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 86 (1871).
104 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
105 Id. at 42.
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the exercise of his fourteenth amendment rights to work at his chosen
occupation with an unconstitutional condition, the surrender of his right
to be free from involuntary servitude. Unconstitutional conditions may
not even be annexed to the exercise of a privilege.""6 It is all the more
certain that they cannot be used to limit the exercise of a constitutional
right.
Even leaving aside the fourteenth amendment right to work, antidis-
crimination laws which provide in effect that a person must serve another
on pain of leaving his chosen occupation is involuntary servitude since
the alternative to the servitude is punishment. It is well settled that the
thirteenth amendment encompasses more than physical compulsion to
labor. Punishment for refusal to work is also within its scope.107
The Supreme Court has several times pointed out that exclusion from
one's occupation is punishment. In Cummings v. Missouri'08 the Court
held that deprivation of the right to engage in a lawful occupation is
punishment,10 9 and further stated: "Disqualification from the pursuits of
a lawful avocation . . .may also, and often has been, imposed as
punishment.""' When this disqualification stems "not from any notion
that the several acts designated unfitness for the callings, but because
it was thought that the several acts ,deserved punishment,"': then the
punitive nature of the disqualification is clear.
Ex parte Garland-"- is to the same effect. The court there held that
"an exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary avoca-
tions of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as
punishment for such conduct."" 8 Likewise, the court said:
The legislature may ... prescribe qualifications for the pursuit of any
of the ordinary avocations of life. The question, in this case, is not as to
the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications, but whether that power
has been exercised as a means for the infliction of punishment, against
the prohibition of the Constitution .. . this result cannot be effected
indirectly by a State under the form of creating qualifications .. .14
106 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216
U.S. 1 (1910).
107 United States v. Clement, 171 Fed. 974 (D.S.C. 1909). See United States v. Reynolds,
235 U.S. 133, 146 (1914) where the Court said:
This labor is performed under the constant coercion and threat of another possible
arrest and prosecution in case he violates the labor contract which he has made with
the surety, and this form of coercion is as potent as it would have been had the law
provided for the seizure and compulsory service of the convict. Compulsion of such
service by the constant fear of imprisonment under criminal laws renders the work
compulsory, as much so as authority to arrest and hold this person would be if the law
authorized that to be done.
108 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
109 Id. at 321-22.
110 Id. at 320.
111 Ibid.112 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
113 Id. at 377.
114 Id. at 379-80.
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Finally, in the more recent case of United States v. Lovett" 5 the Court
was concerned with "'a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion' from a
chosen vocation." Mr. Justice Black held that "this permanent pro-
scription from any opportunity to serve the Government is punishment,
and of a most severe type."1 6
Where a barber or waiter is permanently barred from earning a living
in his occupation unless he serves all who apply, the reality of the situa-
tion is that he is being punished for refusing service. The exclusion from
his calling is a particularly severe sort of punishment. To force him to
serve on pain of such exclusion constitutes involuntary servitude.
Even, however, were the alternative to serving everyone without dis-
crimination of going out of business or leaving one's occupation not
deemed, strictly speaking, punishment, nevertheless, this alternative con-
stitutes such a degree of coercion as to make the service involuntary. It
is well settled that the method of coercion which compels the labor is
immaterial," 7 and that coercion is equally forbidden although exercised
under the forms of law."'
That the loss of the right to serve others, and thereby earn one's living,
is coercion of the most potent sort for all but the wealthy few, can
hardly be gainsaid. It has been held that a statute which tends to prevent
a worker who has broken a contract of service from making a second
contract of service with a new employer during the term of the first con-
tract is unconstitutional under the thirteenth amendment as imposing in-
voluntary servitude.":9 One court said:
If no one else could have employed Carver during the term of his contract
with plaintiff, after he had elected to break that contract, without in-
curring liability to plaintiff for damages, the result would have been
to coerce him to perform the labor required by the contract; for he had
to work or starve. The compulsion would have been scarcely less effectual
than if it had been induced by the fear of punishment under a criminal
statute for breach of his contract . . . .The prohibition is as effective
against indirect as it is against direct actions and laws-statutes or decisions
-which, in operation and effect, produce the condition prohibited. The
validity of the law is determined by its operation and effect. 120
However, the opinion most closely on point is that in the Peonage
Cases.'2 1 The court there first noted:
115 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
116 Id. at 316.
117 Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 873 (1945).
See Bernal v. United States, 241 Fed. 339 (5th Cir. 1917).
118 Matter of Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686 (N.D. Fla. 1905).
119 Hill v. Duckworth, 155 Miss. 484, 124 So. 641 (1929); State v. Armstead, 103 Miss.
790, 60 So. 778 (1913). In Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, [1891J 2 Ch. 416 (Eng.)
it was held that an employee may not be enjoined from going to work for another after
he breaches his contract of employment without express agreement.
120 Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S.C. 287, 292, 102 S.E. 325, 327 (1920).
121 123 Fed. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
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What is this but declaring, if a man breaks his contract with his creditor
without just excuse, he shall not work at his accustomed vocation for others
without permission of the creditor? What is this but a coercive weapon
placed by the law in the hands of the employer to compel the debtor to
pay a debt, to perform the contract? 122
The court then spoke of the right to work. It said:
This statute practically attaints the debtor and makes him a legal
pariah if he attempts to exercise his right to labor without another man's
consent, and that man his creditor. One of the most valuable liberties of
man is to work where he pleases, and to quit one employment and go to
another, subject, of course, to civil liability for breach of contract obliga-
tions. These laws attempt to take this right away and destroy this
liberty. 23
The coercion inherent in limiting the right to work was then set forth.
The opinion states:
The leaving of the service, whether with or without just excuse, puts in-
superable obstacles in the way of earning a livelihood, by the sweat of
his brow, elsewhere than with the first employer or on the rented premises.
He must stay there, or else, leaving, must starve, or go to work elsewhere,
which in most instances he cannot do except by violating this statute and
running the risk of conviction for crime, by not informing the new em-
ployer. Practically, the law places the laborer or renter at the mercy
of his first employer, because of the broken civil contract. An employer
with such power over the sustenance and liberty of another is master of
his destiny and liberty, and the laborer or renter in such a condition is a
serf in all but name. 124
It concludes:
The whole scheme and purpose and the inevitable effect of these statutes
are to coerce the laborer or renter to pay a debt, return to a personal
service, by stress of penal enactments leveled at his person in the one
instance, and against his right to work in the other.... The debtor cannot
be compelled to put himself upon the blacklist that he may be prevented
from getting work without an employer's consent, in order to coerce
him to the performance of a contract of personal service .... 125
The coercion inherent in barring a person from any other employment
is quite different in degree or kind from an action for breach of contract,
which may lie if an employee breaches an agreement to render personal
122 Id. at 685.
123 Id. at 686.
124 Id. at 687.
125 Ibid. See id. at 691 where the court declared:
When the statutes declare that no one shall give croppers or laborers employment, if
they break, without sufficient excuse, contracts of personal service with former
employers, without their consent, what is this but declaring, because a person in
a certain calling or occupation has broken a contract, that he shall not avail himself, no
matter what his necessities, of the usual means, open to all other men, to obtain food
or raiment, except by consent of a former employer?
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services. In such cases, the employee may become liable for actual
damages sustained by his employer, if any. This is true of any contractor.
He is not, however, disabled from earning money entirely. The extraord-
inary compulsion inherent in such a disability is far different from a
requirement that the aggrieved employer be compensated for his actual
loss.12 6
Even less is the compulsion, if it can be called that, inherent in the
withdrawal of wages or other benefits from an individual who will not
work. Such individual is free to substitute other work. He can work for
whomever he pleases. The pay he receives is a benefit which he may take
or not by working or not, but if he declines one job he may still earn
his living at another. Hence, his decision to work at a particular job is
voluntary even if he is motivated by the desire for the compensation it
offers."' This is a far cry from the case of an individual who loses all
right to work for anyone by declining one job or type of service.
It must be remembered that, however compelling the need may seem
that individuals serve others in particular situations, such a requirement
flies in the face of the strong and clear policy of the thirteenth amend-
ment. It has been truly observed that "to compel one person to labor
126 In Shaw v. Fisher, 113 S.C. 287, 292-93, 102 S.E. 325, 327 (1920) the court declared:
Of course, the sanction of the obligation of the contract, and the liability to pay damages
for breach thereof, inhere in every contract, and those alone do not amount to that
compulsion which is prohibited so long as the employee has the liberty at any time
to elect to break the contract, subject only to the legal consequences-an action for
damages-just like any other contractor. But if the law should penalize all who give
him employment, after he has breached his contract, the effect would be to deny to
him the same freedom that every other contractor enjoys, to wit, that of electing at
any time to break his contract, subject only to his liability for damages. To that
extent, liberty of action and freedom of contract is guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
127 In Tyler v. Heidorn, 46 Barb. 439, 458-59 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1866)
the court made this distinction, saying:
The term involuntary servitude, in my opinion [embraces] . . . everything under
the name of servitude, though not denominated slavery, which gives to one person
the control and ownership of the involuntary and compulsory services of another
against his will and consent.
3. The amendment in question was never intended to, and in my opinion does not,
embrace contract service of any description, or such as flows from contracts made by
a party, or grows out of a contract made by another person in regard to property
and connected with its enjoyment, which property such party derives from such other
person and personally enjoys. Such service is never involuntary. The party may at
any time renounce it. It is connected with the enjoyment of property, and by refusing
to accept or to enjoy the property, the party may at all times escape the personal
servitude. These contracts are always either voluntarily entered into by the party
himself, or else they embrace a subject, or property, by relinquishing which the party
always relieves himself from the obligation attached to it . . . . "By taking the benefit
of the grant he voluntarily assumed the liabilities of the original grantee, in respect
to the subject of the grant." The servitude, therefore . . . was not involuntary.
See Dubar Goala v. Union of India, [1952] All India Rep. Cal. 496. See also Sreenwasa
Iyer v. Govinda Kandiyar, [1945] All India Rep. Mad. 50, [19451 Indian L.R. Mad.
Ser. 319, not following Ram Sarup Bhagat v. Bansi Mandar, 42 Indian L.R. Cal. Ser. 742
(1915).
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for another against his will is legalized thraldom. ' ' 128 And the Supreme
Court has declared that "the undoubted aim of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment . . .was not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of
completely free and voluntary labor throughout the United States."'2 9
The clear words of this amendment cannot be frittered away by subtle
subterfuge or refined legal language.
Nor does the fact that the worker's refusal to work for a particular
patron or client may be based on arbitrary grounds alter the legal effect
of the amendment. Indeed, even peons could leave their masters for
adequate cause.'30 The worker's right to discriminate on arbitrary
grounds against serving particular clients or customers is perhaps most
strongly illustrated by Delorme v. Local 624, International Bartenders'
Union.'3
In this case, the plaintiff tavern owner found himself caught in a
jurisdictional dispute between the Teamsters Union and the Brewery
Workers Union. Because he bought beer brewed by the brewery workers,
teamsters picketed his tavern and collectively refused to deliver supplies
purchased by plaintiff from their employers. The plaintiff sued for an
injunction, and the trial court found that the drivers were part of a
conspiracy to drive the plaintiff out of business by withholding supplies
and refusing to deliver them. The trial court then enjoined the teamsters
from interfering with the plaintiff's business. Later, upon a proceeding
for contempt, the trial court further found that with knowledge of the
decree and with intent to violate it, the Teamsters Union and drivers
conspired not to deliver supplies to the plaintiff. The court thereupon
decreed that:
[The drivers] be and they are hereby directed in the future while employed
as drivers delivering products and commodities [to refrain] from making
any discrimination against plaintiff, Leo Delorme, until further order of
the court or until such time as this order may be modified.
It is further ordered that respondents be and they are hereby directed
to forthwith purge themselves of said contempt by refraining in the
future from refusing to make deliveries of products and commodities to
Leo Delorme on the same terms and conditions as to any other person and
128 Ex parte Drayton, 153 Fed. 986, 991 (D.S.C. 1907). And in Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries, Ltd., [1940] A.C. 1014, 1026 (Eng.) Lord Atkin said: "ingrained
in the personal status of a citizen under our laws was the right to choose for himself whom
he would serve; and that this right of choice constituted the main difference between a
servant and a serf."
129 Pollock V. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944).
130 Peonage Cases, 123 Fed. 671, 674 (M.D. Ala. 1903) where the court stated that
the peon could abandon his status "'by some sufficient motive given by one party to
another, such as having greviously injured him, or where the master kept the accounts
in an ambiguous manner, so that the servant could not understand them.'
131 18 Wash. 2d 444, 139 P.2d 619 (1943).
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when directed by their employer to do so until such time as this order is
modified or reversed.
132
The drivers appealed to the Washington State Supreme Court, con-
tending that the order requiring them to deliver products to plaintiff
and not to discriminate against him constituted involuntary servitude.
That court held that while a mandatory injunction in a proper case did
not violate the thirteenth amendment, "the portion of the decree entered
by the trial court containing a mandatory injunction requiring appel-
lants to deliver products and commodities from their respective em-
Dloyers' establishments to the respondent, Leo Delorme, appears to be
subject to valid objection.' 133 The state supreme court thereupon modified
the decree to make it permissive for the drivers to purge themselves of
contempt by delivering products to plaintiff instead of mandatory, as
the trial court had done, and further provided that if the drivers failed to
so purge themselves of their prior contempt, the court might punish them
in an appropriate fashion.
This case is, of course, highly significant, and a strong one indeed for
a mandatory injunction. The drivers have conspired to ruin the plaintiff
by not delivering the products he needs. As previously noted, such a
conspiracy is illegal, even though the individual drivers could, on their
own, refuse to deliver products to the plaintiff. The trial court has ordered
the drivers to repair the damage from their unlawful conspiracy by
ceasing the object of the conspiracy, and by engaging in the deliveries.
Even in such a case, however, the state supreme court is unwilling to
require the drivers to refrain from discrimination. Not even a contempt
of a prior decree whose validity is unchallenged can result in an
affirmative mandate not to discriminate to alleviate the effects of the
conspiracy. So strong is the policy of the law against involuntary servi-
tude that not even a conspiracy not to serve can result in a decree re-
quiring service. Antidiscrimination legislation can hardly justify a dif-
ferent result.
Conclusion
It is one of the most compelling ironies of history to find that in 1964,
Negroes are demanding laws to compel whites to serve them in the very
same occupations which they themselves were freed from serving whites
in 1863, and demanding this under the name of "freedom." For the fact
is that a century ago, Negroes had a near monopoly of the service oc-
132 Id. at 448, 139 P.2d at 621.
13 Id. at 455-56, 139 P.2d at 625.
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cupations now engaged in by employees of so-called "places of public
accommodation."' 84
For example, New York has one of the most stringent set of anti-
discrimination laws. Yet these laws cover the occupations in which
Negroes were compelled to serve a century ago. Thus, we are told:
For generations the New York Negroes had had an almost uncontested
field in many of the gainful occupations. They were . . . boot-blacks
, * , barbers, hotel waiters ... ladies' hairdressers .. .caterers, coachmen.
(At that time a black coachman was almost as sure a guarantee of aris-
tocracy for a Northern white family as a black mammy for a family of
the South.) The United States Census of 1850 lists New York Negroes
in fourteen trades .... [A]s caterers-a number of individuals actually
grew wealthy.135
In a number of northern localities, it was not until the great wave of
European immigration during the 1840s and 1850s that the Negro
monopoly on these service occupations was terminated. In 1853, Frederick
Douglass complained:
Every hour sees the black man [in the North] elbowed out of employment
by some newly arrived immigrant whose hunger and whose color are thought
to give him a better title to the place; and so we believe it will continue to
be until the last prop is leveled beneath us-white men are becoming house
servants, cooks, and stewards on vessels; at hotels, they are becoming
porters ... and barbers-a few years ago a white barber would have been
a curiosity. Now their poles stand on every street .. . .
In the South, Negroes predominated in the service occupations well
into the 20th century. As late as 1930, forty per cent of the workers in
southern hotels, restaurants, and similar establishments were Negro; in
1940, thirty-two per cent were Negro. Myrdal observed that the "loss
of the Negro male waiters was largely the gain of the white waitresses."
He further noted that "travelers in the South often have occasion to ob-
serve that, nowadays, the most modern and busiest hotels and restaurants
tend to have white bell-boys and white waitresses, whereas the old-
fashioned places tend to have Negro servants."' 37 Thus, a century ago,
the Emancipation Proclamation decreed that Negro waiters and waitresses
would no longer have to serve white college students; now, a hundred
years later, Negro college students are demanding laws to compel white
waiters and waitresses to serve them.
134 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 293 (1944) notes that up to 1910, Negroes in the
North were concentrated in service occupations, especially as waiters and barbers.
135 Id. at 1256.
136 Id. at 291-92.
'37 Id. at 1088. He also notes, at 282, that "in . . . a few old cities on the Atlantic
Coast the observer meets an old Negro barber, catering to a passing generation of Southern
gentlemen. Negro waiters are still common, but not so common as even ten years ago. White
waitresses are gradually being substituted for them."
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Negro barbers in the South likewise had a monopoly of this form of
involuntary servitude before the Civil War. Myrdal notes:
In the old South, after the passing of wigs and elaborate hair dressing
for men, the barber.business fell largely into the hands of blacks. An
old Southern gentleman once told me that on his first visit to the North
he experienced a kind of shame for the white man who cut his hair and the
white girls who waited on him at table.18
Thus, we now find, a century after Negroes were freed from the in-
voluntary servitude of cutting the hair of whites, a demand from their
descendants that whites be forced by law to cut their hair. Perhaps
Negroes who say that the Emancipation Proclamation's first century is
being celebrated a hundred years too soon are right. Perhaps the problem
with that document is that it discriminated on racial grounds, and included
only Negroes within its terms.
The thirteenth amendment, however, contained no such limitation.
Instead, "the generality of its language makes its prohibition apply to
slavery of white men as well as that of black men; and also to ... every
other form of compulsory labor to minister to the pleasure, caprice,
vanity, or power of others."' 89 The thirteenth amendment makes no
distinction as to who enforces the labor;"14 nor does it distinguish from
whom compulsory service is extracted. Rather the amendment "reaches
every race and every individual .... Slavery or involuntary servitude of
the Chinese, of the Italian, of the Anglo-Saxon are as much within its
compass as slavery or involuntary servitude of the African.""'' As the
Supreme Court has so eloquently declared:
The language of the Thirteenth Amendment was not new. It reproduced
the historic words of the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the
Northwest Territory and gave them unrestricted application within the
United States and all places subject to their jurisdiction. While the im-
mediate concern was with African slavery, the Amendment was not limited
to that. It was a charter of universal freedom for all persons, of whatever
race, color or estate, under the flag ....
The plain intention was .. . to make labor free, by prohibiting that
control by which the personal service of one man is disposed or of coerced
for another's benefit which is the essence of involuntary servitude.142
The fact that Negroes, or those who sympathize with their aspirations,
188 Id. at 1255 quoting Wertenbaker, The Old South 229-32 (1942). See Myrdal's
remarks at 1088-89 where he declares: "The Negro barber has lost most of his white
business in the South. His gains have been restricted to the segregated Negro neighbor-
hoods . ..."
189 Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. 722, 740 (C.C.D. Cal., 1882).
140 See, for example, United States v. Choctaw Nation, 38 Ct. Cl. 558 (1903), aff'd, 193
U.S. 115 (1904) holding that the slaves of Indian tribes within the United States were freed
by the amendment.
141 Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 17 (1906).
142 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240-41 (1911).
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may believe that white persons who refuse to serve them are being ar-
bitrary or capricious, does not alter in any way the legal effect of the
thirteenth amendment. This provision bans absolutely, and in the most
express terms, the claim of any person to force any other person to serve
him, for any reason whatsoever. Correspondingly, it confers on every
person the absolute and unfettered right to refuse, for any reason or
none at all, to serve any other person. The constitutionally protected
right cannot be abridged or fettered on any pretext or for any reason
whatever, as it is the cornerstone of personal freedom and liberty in
the United States. Those Negro college students and their white sympa-
thizers who so loudly chant a demand for "freedom" and their "constitu-
tional rights," and who so vociferously demand that whites serve them,'14 3
would do well to first examine the Constitution themselves, and find out
where their freedom and constitutional rights end, and those of others
they would in fact violate, begin. As one case unequivocally stated:
We are not advised of any rule of law under which any man in this
country will be forced to serve with his labor any other man whom he does
not wish to serve.
If the injunctive order be construed to mean that the officers and mem-
bers of the Longshoremen Association Local No. 1416 were thereby re-
quired to load or unload the trucks of "Collins" although there was no
contractual relation between the local and Collins, then such construction
would violate the constitutional provision above referred to. We think
it will not be contended that any member of the local could be committed
to jail for refusing to load or unload the "Collins" trucks. That service
required the performance of manual labor and it is beyond the power of
courts to punish one by imprisonment for failure to engage in involuntary
servitude.144
That antidiscrimination laws which compel one person to serve another
are unconstitutional seems to be open to little doubt. However, most
judges before whom such cases have come have acted as if they never
heard of the thirteenth amendment. But one perceptive jurist, Judge
Joseph H. Mallery of the Washington State Supreme Court, recently
recognized the conflict between such legislation and the United States
Constitution. To this author, his dissenting opinion in Browning v.
Slenderella Systems 145 "hits the nail on the head" and should be required
reading for all sit-ins claiming "constitutional rights." The opinion is well
worth quoting. As judge Mallery declared:
All persons familiar with the rights of English speaking peoples know
that their liberty inheres in the scope of the individual's right to make un-
143 See N.Y. Times, July 7, 1963, p. 1, col. 2.
144 Henderson v. Coleman, 150 Fla. 185, 196-97, 7 So. 2d 117, 121 (1942).
145 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959).
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coerced choices as to what he will think and say; to what religion he will
adhere; what occupation he will choose; where, when, how, and for whom
he will work, and generally to be free to make his own decisions and choose
his courses of action in his private civil affairs. These constitutional
rights of law-abiding citizens are the very essence of American liberties ....
* . . [D]iscrimination is but another word for free choice. Indeed, he
would not be free himself if he had no right so to do. In dealings between
men, both cannot be free unless each acts voluntarily, otherwise one is
subjected to the other's will.
Cash registers ring for a Negro's as well as for a white man's money.
Practically all American businesses, excepting a few having social overtones
or involving personal services, actively seek Negro patronage for that reason.
The few that do not serve Negroes adopt that policy either because their
clientele insist upon exclusiveness, or because of the reluctance of em-
ployees to render intimate personal service to Negroes. Both the clientele
and the business operator have a constitutional right to discriminate in
their private affairs upon any conceivable basis. The right to exclusive-
ness, like the right to privacy, is essential to freedom. No one is legally
aggrieved by its exercise.
The majority opinion violates the thirteenth amendment to the United
States constitution. It provides, inter alia: "Neither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude ... shall exist within the United States .... "
Negroes should be familiar with this amendment. Since its passage,
they have not been compelled to serve any man against their will. When
a white woman is compelled against her will to give a Negress a Swedish
massage, that too is involuntary servitude ....
Through what an arc the pendulum of Negro rights has swung since the
extreme position of the Dred Scott decision! Those rights reached dead
center when the thirteenth amendment to the United States constitution
abolished the ancient wrong of Negro slavery. This court has now swung
to the opposite extreme in its opinion subjecting white people to "involun-
tary servitude" to Negroes. [Emphasis by the court.]146
146 Id. at 454-57, 341 P.2d at 868-69.
